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Abstract
Observers often fail to detect the appearance of an unexpected visual object (‘‘inattentional blindness’’). Experiment 1 studied the
eﬀects of ﬁxation position and spatial attention on inattentional blindness. Eye movements were measured. We found strong inat-
tentional blindness to the unexpected stimulus even when it was ﬁxated and appeared in one of the expected positions. The results
suggest that spatial attention is not suﬃcient for attentional capture and awareness. Experiment 2 showed that the stimulus was
easier to consciously detect when it was colored but the relation of the color to the color of the attended objects had no eﬀect
on detection. The unexpected stimulus was easiest to detect, when it represented the same category as the attended objects.
 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Most of the studies on attentional capture have fo-
cused on implicit attentional capture, that is, on how
well observers can ignore something they expect but
know to be irrelevant (Simons, 2000). These studies have
examined how a salient, irrelevant stimulus aﬀects per-
formance on another task, regardless of whether the
observers become aware of the stimulus or not. Explicit
attentional capture, on the other hand, occurs when a
salient, unexpected stimulus draws attention and leads
to subjective visual awareness of it. The critical question
here is whether or not the observers will consciously no-
tice something that they do not expect. For example, it is
important that you notice a child appearing in front of0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.visres.2004.07.026
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E-mail address: mika.koivisto@utu.ﬁ (M. Koivisto).your car as you are ﬁddling with the radio (explicit
attentional capture), but it does not matter if you are
slower in turning the knob (implicit attentional capture)
(Most, Scholl, Cliﬀord, & Simons, in press). Recent
studies suggest that observers with normal visual ability
are often functionally ‘‘blind’’ to the appearance of
unexpected objects or large unexpected changes, not
only for artiﬁcial displays under laboratory conditions
(Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons & Chabris, 1999) but also
in real-world situations (Simons, Chabris, Schnur, & Le-
vin, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1998). Although observers
intuitively believe that they will easily become aware
of the appearance of such unexpected objects or
changes, empirical studies on the beliefs of observers
have shown that their intuitive conceptions about their
probability of detection are strongly overestimated (Le-
vin, Drivdahl, Momen, & Beck, 2002; Levin, Momen,
Drivdahl, & Simons, 2000).
Do we subjectively see an object that we are not
attending to? Mack and Rock (1998) have recently
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this issue. In the typical version of their task, observers
attended to a cross appearing for 200ms in the center of
the viewing area. Their primary task was to judge which
of its arms was longest. In the third or fourth trial, an
unexpected stimulus (e.g., a square) appeared in a quad-
rant of the cross. Immediately after the trial, the observ-
ers were asked if they had seen anything that had not
been present on previous trials. The results revealed that
about 25% of the observers showed inattentional blind-
ness, that is, they did not detect the unexpected stimulus.
Even more surprising was the ﬁnding that when the
cross appeared parafoveally and the unexpected stimu-
lus appeared at ﬁxation, about 75% of observers missed
it. In principle, this ﬁnding could be explained by assum-
ing that the unexpected stimulus at ﬁxation is not seen as
a new object but as a change to the ﬁxation cross and
therefore it is not considered anything additional to be
reported. Mack and Rock (1998) were able to rule out
this explanation in their follow-up experiments. They
suggested that attention to objects at ﬁxation could be
actively inhibited when no objects were expected to ap-
pear to ﬁxation.
They also manipulated the zone of attention in diﬀer-
ent ways. Inattentional blindness decreased when the
unexpected stimulus was positioned within the attention
zone, suggesting that attention is needed for conscious
perception. However, it is surprising that still about
25% of observers failed to detect the unexpected stimu-
lus even when it fell within the zone of attention. Why
did they not detect the stimulus within the attended
area? It seems that spatial attention to the relevant area
is not suﬃcient for conscious perception of an unex-
pected stimulus. The same point is illustrated also in
selective-looking experiments, in which observers moni-
tor one of two simultaneous events, for example a video
of a team in black shirts passing basketball superim-
posed on a video of a team in white shirts passing bas-
ketball. When the observers monitor one of the teams,
they often fail to notice that a gorilla or a woman with
an open umbrella walks across the display (Becklen &
Cervone, 1983; Simons & Chabris, 1999). It is possible
that the undetected gorilla and the woman appeared at
the attended spatial area, although the distribution of
spatial attention was not systematically manipulated in
these studies. The distance of the unexpected stimulus
from the focus of attention was systematically manipu-
lated in a selective-looking study by Most, Simons,
Scholl, and Chabris (2000). The results supported a role
for object distance from the focus of attention. In spite
of that, less than half of the observers detected the unex-
pected object when it appeared on the horizontal line
that was monitored, suggesting that spatial attention
cannot fully account for detection of unexpected objects.
In the present study, we examined further the eﬀects
of ﬁxation position, on the one hand, and spatial atten-tion, on the other hand, on inattentional blindness. The
ﬁnding of stronger inattentional blindness at ﬁxation
than at periphery needs further replications because it
has been shown only in the laboratory of Mack and
Rock (1998) and only with variants of their cross judge-
ment task. In addition, it might be important to control
for ﬁxation position with an eye tracker. On the other
hand, an exactly opposite prediction may be put forth
on the basis of change blindness studies where observers
are explicitly asked to look for sudden changes in a vis-
ual environment. In the study of Hollingworth, Schrock,
and Henderson (2001) it was found that a change is
more readily detected if it appears close to the current
ﬁxation than further away from the location of current
ﬁxation (see also Dornhoefer, Unema, & Velichkovsky,
2002). Such an eﬀect may not necessarily generalize to
inattentional blindness, however, because the location
of attended targets may be dissociated from the location
of ﬁxated targets (e.g., Newby & Rock, 1998; Posner,
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), even though in many visual
tasks there exists a close link between eye movements
and attention shifts.
Unlike the previous studies on explicit attentional
capture and inattentional blindness, we measured the
eye movements by an eye tracker to ensure that the par-
ticipants followed the instructions and kept their ﬁxa-
tion at the center where the unexpected stimulus
appeared. In addition, eye movement measurements al-
lowed us to identify diﬀerent eye movement patterns and
to study whether they would reveal anything important
about explicit attentional capture.2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we studied the eﬀects of eye move-
ments and spatial attention on inattentional blindness.
Although it is clear that when a stimulus is expected,
attending to the spatial position in which it is going to
appear enhances its detection (Posner et al., 1980), it is
not clear to what extent an unexpected, irrelevant stimu-
lus can be detected when attention is distributed to the
spatial location in which it appears. The ﬁnding of the
relatively large amount of inattentional blindness (about
25%) for unexpected, irrelevant stimuli within the at-
tended zone in the series of experiments by Mack and
Rock (1998) suggests that attending to the spatial loca-
tion of the unexpected stimulus is not suﬃcient for con-
scious detection of it.
In the present experiment, the observers named red
and blue digits that appeared sequentially on the screen.
In the third trial, an unexpected stimulus (black circle)
appeared at the center of the viewing area for 700ms.
After the third trial, the observers were asked whether
or not they detected anything new that was not present
in the previous trials. Then the experiment continued in
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could expect something new to appear—therefore, these
trials were divided attention trials (Mack & Rock, 1998).
Finally, three full attention trials were presented. Here
the only task was to detect whether or not anything
new appeared. We expected that the detection perform-
ance in the divided and full attention trials would im-
prove, which would conﬁrm that the unexpected
stimulus is perceptible with attention.
Because only one critical inattention trial was possi-
ble for each observer, all the variables had to be manip-
ulated between the participants. We used two diﬀerent
tasks in the experiment: the observers either kept ﬁxat-
ing on the center ( ﬁxation condition) or they followed
the digits with their eyes (eye movement condition). To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time eye movements have
been recorded in the inattentional blindness paradigm to
verify that the observers really were looking at the unex-
pected stimulus. A second issue that was studied was the
role of spatial attention in inattentional blindness. For
half of the participants within the ﬁxation and eye move-
ment groups, the digits never appeared at the center of
the viewing area and, therefore, there was no reason to
monitor the ﬁxation position (center-unattended condi-
tion). For the other half of the observers, one of the
two digits could appear also at the center in the non-crit-
ical trials—this manipulation was assumed to distribute
their attention also to the center of the area (center-
attended condition).3. Method
3.1. Participants
Sixty-four participants (mean age: 23.3 years) with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision took part for par-
tial course requirement in introductory psychology at
the University of Turku. Each participant was assigned
either to the eye movement or ﬁxation condition. Within
the eyemovement and ﬁxation conditions, half of the par-
ticipants were assigned to the center-unattended condi-
tion and the other half to the center-attended condition.Fig. 1. An example of a critical trial. The circle was black while t3.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Eye movements were collected by the EYELINK eye-
tracker manufactured by SR Research Ltd. (Canada).
The eyetracker is an infra-red video-based tracking sys-
tem combined with hyperacuity image processing. There
are two cameras mounted on a headband (one for each
eye) including two infrared LEDs for illuminating each
eye. The headband weighs 450g in total. The cameras
sample pupil location and pupil size at the rate of
250Hz. Registration is monocular and is performed
for the selected eye by placing the camera and the
two-infra-red light sources 4–6cm away from the eye.
The spatial accuracy is better than 0.5. Head position
with respect to the computer screen is tracked with the
help of a head-tracking camera mounted on the center
of the headband at the level of the forehead. Four LEDs
are attached to the corners of the computer screen,
which are viewed by the head-tracking camera, once
the subject sits directly facing the screen. Possible head
motion is detected as movements of the four LEDs
and is compensated for on-line from the eye position
records.
The stimuli were presented on a CRT within a round,
white area (10.1 in diameter, 88.6cd/m2) (see Fig. 1).
The stimuli were red and blue digits (1–4, or 5) (0.5),
and a black circle (0.5) served as the critical, unex-
pected stimulus. The luminance for the red color was
22.7cd/m2, for blue 13.2cd/m2, and for black 4.3cd/
m2, respectively.
3.3. Procedure
The experiment began with one practice trial fol-
lowed by three inattention trials. Each trial began with
a presentation of the ﬁxation cross at the center of the
area for 1500ms. It was followed by a red digit in one
of the quadrants or at the center for 350ms, and then
by a blue digit in an other quadrant or in the center
for 350ms, followed by a mask for 500ms. The blue di-
git never appeared in the quadrant opposite to the red
one (e.g., the red one in the upper left quadrant, and
the blue one in the lower right quadrant) but always inhe ﬁrst digit was actually red and the second one was blue.
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This pattern was favored over complete randomization
to avoid eye movements via the center to the opposite
quadrant (in the eye movement conditions), and thus
to avoid possible accompanying ﬁxations to the center
when no digit was presented there. The digits that ap-
peared in the quadrants were positioned 3.2 away from
the center. The third trial was the critical inattention
trial in which the unexpected stimulus (the black circle)
appeared at the center of the screen at the same time that
the ﬁrst digit appeared and remained visible until the
mask was presented, that is, for 700ms. During the crit-
ical trials, the digits never appeared at the center.
The participants in the eye movement condition
(N = 32) were asked to move their eyes ﬁrst to the red
digit and then to the blue digit in the same order that
they appeared, and at the same time they were asked
to name the digits. The participants in the ﬁxation con-
dition (N = 32) were asked to ﬁxate throughout the trials
on the ﬁxation cross and to name aloud the digits. In
addition, the area on which the digits could be expected
to appear was manipulated. For half of the observers in
each condition, the digits in the primary task never
appeared at the center of the viewing area (center-
unattended condition). For the other half, one of the dig-
its in the primary task appeared in center of the screen in
the practice/show up trial and in the ﬁrst non-critical
trial in the inattention, divided-attention, and full-atten-
tion conditions. Thus, these observers could expect
digits to appear also in the center (center-attended condi-
tion). Prior to the practice/show-up trial the participants
were told that this trial will demonstrate how the digits
will be presented on the screen. In the center-attended
condition, one of the two digits appeared in the center,
whereas in the center-unattended condition both digits
appeared in the quadrants.
Immediately after the critical trial, the participants
were asked, ‘‘Did you detect anything new that had
not been present on the prior trials; if you did, what
did you detect (identiﬁcation task)’’? After answering,
ﬁve alternative shapes (diamond, star, triangle, circle,
square), printed in black on a white paper, were pre-
sented and the participants were asked to select the
new shape or to make a guess in the case that they did
not perceive it (forced choice task). Then they were
asked to specify or guess the location in which the shape
had appeared. Observers were regarded as having de-
tected the stimulus if they answered ‘‘yes’’ when asked
if they detected anything new that had not been present
on the prior trials and if they also were able to perform
correctly either in the identiﬁcation, forced choice, or
location task.
After answering the questions, the experiment contin-
ued with three divided-attention trials which were other-
wise identical to the inattention trials but now the
participants could expect something new to appear onthe screen. The divided-attention trials were followed
by three full-attention trials. Here the only task was to
detect whether anything new appeared on the screen.
The third trial within each sequence was always the crit-
ical one, which was followed by the detection, identiﬁca-
tion, forced-choice and location tasks about the shape of
the new object.4. Results
In the analyses of the eye movements, participants
were considered to be ﬁxating at the center of the view-
ing area if their ﬁxations did not deviate more than 0.8
from the center. Fixations in the quadrant where a stim-
ulus appeared, with the distance more than 0.8 from the
center, were classiﬁed as eye movements toward the
stimulus.
In the eye movement condition, various patterns of
eye movements were observed during the critical inat-
tention trial. Two observers made an eye movement to
one of the two digits only and two participants remained
ﬁxating on the center and did not move their eyes to
either of the digits. These four participants were re-
moved from the analyses reported below because they
were not following the instructions. The most typical
pattern was that the eyes moved from the ﬁxation cross
to the red digit and then to the blue digit (19 observers).
It was also quite common that after moving the eyes
from the ﬁxation cross to the red digit, an additional ﬁx-
ation was made on the unexpected stimulus in the center
of the screen, and then the eyes were moved to the blue
digit (nine observers). This pattern was more common in
the center-attended condition (seven observers) than
in the center-unattended condition (two observers).
When the number of such eye movement patterns was
counted across the second and third inattention trial
and the second and third divided-attention trial (which
were physically identical in the two attention area condi-
tions), the total number of such patterns was 28 in the
center-attended condition and 10 in the center-unat-
tended condition. These results suggest that the manip-
ulation of the attention area was eﬀective. However, of
the nine observers who moved their eyes to the unex-
pected stimulus in the critical trial between the saccades
to the ﬁrst and second digits, only three (33%) detected
that something new appeared. Thus, these observers did
not consciously perceive the unexpected stimulus. It is
also clear that this eye movement pattern should not
be considered as evidence for implicit perception either.
A similar pattern (ﬁrst digit-ﬁxation cross-second digit)
was equally common also in the preceding non-critical
trial in which the unexpected stimulus was not present
(three observers in the center-unattended condition
and seven observers in the center-attended condition),
suggesting that the pattern was not related to the
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Fig. 3. Percentage of observers in the center-unattended and center-
attended conditions for detecting the unexpected stimulus under
inattention, divided attention, and full attention. The results are
pooled across the eye movement and ﬁxation conditions.
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general pattern related to the distribution of attention.
In the ﬁxation condition, most of the observers kept
their ﬁxation on the center during the critical inattention
trial (25 observers). Seven observers made an eye move-
ment either to one or both of the digits, and they were
removed from the further analyses as they did not follow
the instructions.
Fig. 2 presents the results as a function of the eye
movement vs. ﬁxation condition. As can be seen, only
17% of the observers detected that an unexpected stim-
ulus appeared. However, the overall performance level
is higher in the divided-attention trials than in the inat-
tention trials. In full-attention trials, the performance
approached ceiling.
The results were analyzed with Chi-square test, but
when any of the cells had an expected value smaller than
ﬁve, Fishers Exact test was used. Comparisons of the
eye movement condition (N = 28) and the ﬁxation con-
dition (N = 25) (see Fig. 2) in inattention trials did not
show any diﬀerences in detection (14% vs. 20%) (Fishers
Exact Test: p < 0.72). There were no diﬀerences between
the conditions ( p-values > 0.76) in the divided-attention
and full-attention trials.
Next we analyzed the data by contrasting the two
attention area conditions (see Fig. 3). In the inattention
trials, there seems to be a non-signiﬁcant tendency for
the observers in the center-unattended condition (N =
25) to perform better than those in the center-attended
condition (N = 28) (28% vs. 7%) (Fishers Exact Test:
P < 0.08). Of those participants in the center-attended
condition, who were allowed to move their eyes, seven
made eye ﬁxations to the unexpected stimulus between
ﬁxations to the digits, but only one of them detected
the stimulus.0
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Fig. 2. Percentage of observers in the eye movement and ﬁxation
conditions for detecting the unexpected stimulus under inattention,
divided attention, and full attention. The results are pooled across the
center-unattended and center-attended conditions.In the divided-attention and full-attention conditions,
detection performance did not diﬀer between the atten-
tion area conditions (P-values > 0.28).
Mack and Rock (1998) suggested that the strong inat-
tentional blindness that was observed when the unex-
pected stimulus was presented to the ﬁxation position
in their experiment was due to participants actively
inhibiting attention to ﬁxation. We tested this hypothe-
sis by comparing the results in the inattention trials be-
tween the attention area conditions for the observers
included in the ﬁxation condition (N = 12 + 13). The
hypothesis predicts stronger inattentional blindness for
the observers in the center-unattended condition be-
cause they did not expect any stimuli to appear at the
ﬁxation point and hence they would inhibit attention
to ﬁxation position. The results did not support this pre-
diction as the participants in the center-unattended con-
dition (33%) did not show any evidence for decreased
detection of the unexpected stimulus at the ﬁxation as
compared with the participants in the center-attended
condition (8%) (Fishers Exact Test: p < 0.17).5. Discussion
Fixation position did not have any eﬀects on inatten-
tional blindness. The unexpected stimulus was equally
poorly detected irrespective of whether the observers
kept on ﬁxating on the center of the ﬁeld in which the
circle appeared or whether they followed the digits with
their eyes. In general, this ﬁnding supports the view that
attention can move in the visual ﬁeld independently of
ﬁxation (Newby & Rock, 1998; Posner et al., 1980).
Our result contrasts with the ﬁnding of Mack and Rock
(1998) who reported that the stimuli displayed at ﬁxa-
tion were less likely to be detected than those presented
in the periphery. Their hypothesis that attention to the
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port because the participants in the center-unattended
condition, who did not expect any stimuli at the ﬁxation
position and, therefore, should have inhibited attention
to ﬁxation, were not less likely to detect the unexpected
stimulus than the participants in the center-attended
condition who should not have inhibited attention to
ﬁxation. It should be noted, however, that we presented
the unexpected stimulus always at center (i.e., at the
place of the ﬁxation cross), so that the ﬁxation-periphery
manipulation is not directly comparable to that of Mack
and Rock (1998).
Neither were we able to get support for the prediction
made on the basis of a change blindness study of Hol-
lingworth et al. (2001) about the role of ﬁxation position
in detection performance. Hollingworth et al. (2001)
demonstrated more accurate (and faster) detection per-
formance if the stimulus appeared close to the ﬁxation
than further away from the ﬁxation—a phenomenon
we did not observe. However, it should be noted that
there are important diﬀerences in the task employed
by Hollingworth et al. (2001) and by us. In Holling-
worth et al. (2001) the to-be-detected change was one
among the attended stimuli (the participants were to at-
tend to relatively large visual scenes), so it is understand-
able that allowing the eyes to move along with the
attention improved performance. In the present study,
however, the to-be-detected target was not expected,
and even cueing the eyes to move to the location where
the unexpected stimulus later arrived (i.e., in the center-
attended condition) did not seem to help detect the
unexpected stimulus.
Although ﬁxation position and attention can be
experimentally dissociated, in normal viewing condi-
tions they are closely related. The eyes tend to move
to the stimuli or features which have drawn attention
to themselves. In the present eye movement condition,
eye movement analyses showed that the observers in
the center-attended condition made more ﬁxations to
the center of the viewing area than those in the center-
unattended condition, suggesting that they were
attending to the center of the viewing area. Thus, the
manipulation of the attention area was eﬀective. How-
ever, the observers monitoring the ﬁxation position were
not able to detect the unexpected stimulus any better
than the observers who were not monitoring it. This re-
sult contrasts with the ﬁndings that the closer to the cen-
ter of the attention the unexpected stimulus appears, the
better it will be detected (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most
et al., 2000; Newby & Rock, 1998). However, we did
not manipulate the distance between the center of atten-
tion and the stimulus but the size of the attended area.
The attention area was distributed across the entire
viewing area in the center-attended condition. In this
case, the larger attention area did not enhance the detec-
tion of the unexpected stimulus. There was a greaternumber of possible combinations of the locations in
which the red and blue digits in the primary task could
appear in the center-attended condition (16) than in the
center-unattended condition (8). Thus, although none of
the observers in the two conditions had any diﬃculties
in naming the digits, it is likely that more attentional re-
sources were needed for the primary task in the center-
attended condition, leaving less resources for detecting
anything new. We conducted post-hoc analyses of the
pupil sizes to test this possibility. Pupil size has been
shown to reﬂect variation in processing load. For exam-
ple, Hyo¨na¨, Tommola, and Alaja (1995) demonstrated
that a cognitively more demanding task was associated
with larger pupil size than a less demanding task (for a
review, see Beatty, 1982).
Pupil sizes (area in pixels) were measured in the sec-
ond inattention trial both during the ﬁxation cross and
the actual task in the center-attended and center-unat-
tended conditions of the eye movement condition. The
second trial was selected because it did not contain the
unexpected stimulus. It was possible to measure sepa-
rately the pupil sizes during the ﬁxation and the naming
task performance for those observers who moved their
eyes away from the ﬁxation cross during the task
(n = 14 + 16). Pupil area rather than pupil diameter
was used as the dependent variable, as pupil area may
be considered a more sensitive measure (the pupils
shape is elliptical, so changes in pupil size may be more
noticeable in area than in diameter). A Time (ﬁxation vs.
task) · Condition (center-unattended vs. center-
attended) ANOVA revealed a main eﬀect for Time
(F(1,28) = 5.01, p < 0.05), showing that the pupil was
larger during the task performance (2781 pixels) than
during ﬁxation (2316 pixels). This result suggests that
pupil size was sensitive to the increase of attentional
load during the task. Also the main eﬀect for condition
was signiﬁcant (F(1,28) = 4.54, p < 0.05), indicating that
the pupils were larger in the center-attended condition
(2781 pixels) than in the center-unattended condition
(1931 pixels). This suggests that the center-attended con-
dition was associated with a higher processing load than
the center-unattended condition. The Time · Condition
interaction approached statistical signiﬁcance (F(1,28) =
3.82, p = 0.06), suggesting that the diﬀerence in pupil
size tended to be larger during the ﬁxation cross (2776
and 1855 pixels, for center-attended and center-unat-
tended conditions, respectively) than during the actual
task (2786 and 2006 pixels). Thus, the pupil in the cen-
ter-attended group was larger, suggesting that they were
experiencing stronger cognitive load than the center-
unattended group. Moreover, the pupil sizes diﬀered be-
tween the conditions already during the ﬁxation cross
when the observers were expecting the stimuli (t(28) =
2.39, p < 0.05). This pattern is understandable as it is
likely that the observers were preparing for the task
and distributing their attention to the appropriate
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center-attended condition, the more demanding primary
task may have withdrawn attentional resources away
from the ‘‘secondary task’’ (that is, the resources availa-
ble for detecting the unexpected stimulus), which may
partly explain why the detection performance was not
better when also the center area was monitored. In Sec-
tion 9, we will discuss further this issue of detecting stim-
uli at ﬁxation.
Before leaving the pupil size analyses, a word of cau-
tion might be in place. The diﬀerence in pupil size be-
tween the center-attended and center-unattended
conditions is based on a between-subject comparison.
As pupil size in general diﬀers across individuals, it is
in principle possible that more participants with bigger
pupils were by chance selected to the center-attended
condition. A within-subject comparison, which would
not entail this potential confound, was not possible to
do in the present circumstances.6. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggested that ﬁxating the eyes on and
distributing attention to the area on which the unex-
pected stimulus appears are not suﬃcient for its detec-
tion. It appears that something more than that is
required. Perhaps the stimulus must be of certain kind
for it to capture attention. According to the contin-
gent-capture hypothesis (Folk, Remington, & Johnston,
1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994) attentional
capture is not purely a function of the presence of a
stimulus property (e.g., color or onset) but depends on
the existence of a prior attentional ‘‘set’’ for the eliciting
property. The observers attentional set consists of the
properties that the participant attends to and prepares
to respond to selectively. When the attentional set of
an observer is for a particular feature, only that feature
will capture attention. It should be noted that the con-
tingent-capture hypothesis has been developed primarily
in the implicit attentional capture studies, in which an
expected but irrelevant stimulus aﬀects performance,
having no direct predictions for explicit attentional cap-
ture and awareness. It does not make any predictions
concerning unexpected stimuli. However, selective-look-
ing experiments suggest that some of the predictions of
contingent capture generalize to explicit attentional cap-
ture: the similarity of the color of the unexpected stimu-
lus to that of the expected stimulus may play a role in
attentional capture when viewing dynamic events (Most
et al., 2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999). However, it is not
clear whether or not the results from the selective-look-
ing tasks can be generalized to static and less complex
inattention conditions. In selective-looking, the display
contains several items and the observers attend to one
type of items and selectively ignore other types of items.Most et al. (2001) provided preliminary evidence indi-
cating that selective ignoring of items on the basis of col-
or may contribute to detection of the unexpected
stimulus in the selective-looking paradigm. In contrast,
there is nothing to selectively ignore in the stimulus dis-
plays of a typical inattentional blindness paradigm as
they contain only one or two expected items but no
to-be-ignored items. Therefore, the observer may not
have any need to establish an attentional set for the pur-
pose of distinguishing attended from ignored items in
tasks with more simple displays like those used in the
present study. This view predicts that an unexpected
stimulus with an expected color would not be detected
more frequently than an unexpected stimulus with an
unexpected color. However, if the salience of the color
plays a role here, then a stimulus with a salient but unex-
pected color should be detected more often than a stim-
ulus with a less salient color. In Experiment 2a we tested
the eﬀect of the color of the unexpected stimulus on
detection under inattention. As in the primary task of
Experiment 1, the observers were expecting red and blue
digits which they had to name; the unexpected stimulus
was presented either in the same color as the attended
stimuli (red or blue) or in an unexpected but salient col-
or (green).
In addition to stimulus salience and color, the mean-
ing of the stimulus may contribute to the detection of
unexpected stimuli. Mack and Rock (1998) found that
some stimuli (observers name, happy face icon) were
more easily detected under inattention than other stim-
uli (someone elses name, neutral face icon). They attrib-
uted this eﬀect to the signal value (i.e., meaningfulness)
of the stimuli. One should note that the happy face and
observers name are emotionally loaded stimuli. In
Experiment 2b, we tested the eﬀect of the stimulus
meaning by including an emotionally neutral stimulus
condition in which the unexpected stimulus was a digit
appearing in black. Thus, the stimulus was from the
same category as the attended red and blue digits in
the primary task but it had a diﬀerent color. If the cat-
egory of the stimulus determines whether inattentional
blindness occurs or not, then the degree of inattentional
blindness should be smaller for the black digit than for
the black circle. We also included a pseudo-digit condi-
tion to control that salience or similarity of the unex-
pected stimulus to the digits would not be responsible
for the expected eﬀect of category.7. Method
7.1. Participants, stimuli, and procedure
Forty participants (mean age: 22.1 years) took part in
Experiment 2a and 40 (mean age: 21.8 years) in Experi-
ment 2b. They had normal or corrected-to-normal
3218 M. Koivisto et al. / Vision Research 44 (2004) 3211–3221vision took and participated for partial course require-
ment in introductory psychology at the University of
Turku. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in
Experiment 1 with the exception that in Experiment 2a
for half of the observers the critical stimulus in the third,
sixth, and ninth trial was a red or a blue circle and for
the other half it was a green circle. The luminance for
the green color was 16.2cd/m2. In Experiment 2b, the
critical stimulus was either a black digit (6) or a black
pseudo-digit which was constructed by cutting the digit
6 vertically into two parts and then changing the posi-
tions of the left half and the right half. The procedure
was the same as that for the ﬁxation and center-attended
condition in the previous experiment. The participants
were instructed to keep ﬁxating on the ﬁxation cross,
and one of the digits appeared in the center of the screen
in the practice trial and in the ﬁrst non-critical trial in
the inattention, divided-attention, and full-attention
conditions. After each critical trial, the detection,
identiﬁcation, forced-choice, and location speciﬁcation
tasks were presented as in Experiment 1 with the
exception that in the forced-choice task of Experiment
2b the circle was replaced by the digit ‘‘6’’ or the
pseudo-digit.8. Results
Five of the participants in Experiment 2a and ﬁve in
Experiment 2b were eliminated from the analyses due to
eye movements deviating more than 0.8 from the center
during the critical inattention trial.
Fig. 4 shows the results from Experiment 2a. The
comparison of the red/blue circle condition (N = 18),
green circle condition (N = 17) and the corresponding
black circle condition of Experiment 1 (N = 13) with
the same instructions showed a statistically signiﬁcant0
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Fig. 4. Percentage of observers in the color conditions for detecting
the unexpected stimulus under inattention, divided attention, and full
attention.diﬀerence in the critical inattention trial (v2 = 9.66,
p < 0.01). Pair-wise tests revealed that the detection of
the black circle (8%) was poorer than that of the red/
blue circle (61%) (v2 = 9.08, p < 0.01) and that of the
green circle (53%) (Fishers Exact Test: p < 0.02),
whereas there was no diﬀerence between the red/blue
and green circle conditions. There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the conditions in divided- and full-
attention trials. The results suggest that the color of
the unexpected stimulus has an eﬀect on attentional cap-
ture under inattention. However, the similarity of the
color of the unexpected stimulus to the color of the ex-
pected stimulus does not seem to play a role in the cur-
rent task.
Fig. 5 shows the results from Experiment 2b. The
comparison of the detection performance in the critical
inattention trial between the digit (N = 18), pseudo-digit
(N = 17), and black circle (Experiment 1; N = 13)
conditions showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (v2 = 30.19,
p < 0.001). The performance was better in the digit
condition (100%) than in the pseudo-digit condition
(29%) (v2 = 19.34, p < 0.001) or black circle condition
(8%) (v2 = 27.11, p < 0.001). The pseudo-digit condition
did not diﬀer from the black circle condition (p > 0.14).
In the divided-attention trial, the detection rate was
lower in the black circle condition (69%) than in the
other conditions (100%) (v2 = 11.75, p < 0.01). There
were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the conditions
in the full-attention trial (p > 0.25).
It is also interesting that the detection of the black di-
git in Experiment 2b was better than the detection of the
red/blue circle in Experiment 2a (61%) in the inattention
trial (Fishers Exact Test: p < 0.01), showing that a stim-
ulus from the same category as the expected stimuli was
easier to detect than a stimulus with the same color but a
diﬀerent form as the expected stimuli.0
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Fig. 5. Percentage of observers in the category conditions for detecting
the unexpected stimulus under inattention, divided attention, and full
attention.
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The present study showed strong inattentional blind-
ness for a relatively long lasting (700ms), irrelevant,
unexpected stimulus. Most of the observers did not de-
tect such a stimulus even when it fell into one out of ﬁve
attended locations or when their eyes were ﬁxated on it,
or both. However, inattentional blindness to colored
stimuli was reduced, irrespective of whether or not the
color of the stimulus corresponded to that of the at-
tended stimulus. When the unexpected stimulus was
from the same category as the expected stimuli, all the
observers detected it. The enhancement of the detection
performance in the divided attention and full attention
trials conﬁrmed that the unexpected stimulus was
observable with attention.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that an unexpected stim-
ulus (the black circle) that did not share any salient fea-
tures with the expected stimuli (red and blue digits) was
not detected by most of the observers. Importantly, inat-
tentional blindness was also present when the observers
attended to the spatial position in which the stimulus ap-
peared. Similarly, in selective-looking experiments
observers tend to fail to notice unexpected objects which
pass through the attended area (Most et al., 2000; Most
et al., 2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999). Thus, spatial
attention to the relevant location is not suﬃcient for
attentional capture. In addition, the present study
showed that ﬁxating the eyes on the position of the
unexpected stimulus does not increase the probability
of detection. The same point was indirectly illustrated
in a recent study (Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003)
which used an eye-tracker and showed that people talk-
ing on a cell phone during a driving simulation could
not remember the contents of road signs even though
they had ﬁxated them. In contrast, the current study
showed that immediately after the presentation of an
unexpected stimulus people do not report having no-
ticed it at all, even though it is ﬁxated.
The hypothesis proposed by Mack and Rock (1998),
that unexpected stimuli in the ﬁxation position are diﬃ-
cult to detect because attention to ﬁxation position is
inhibited, did not gain support in the present study. In
Experiment 1 those observers who attended to the center
were no more likely to detect the unexpected stimulus
than those who did not attend to it—there was in fact
a trend toward the opposite direction. In the center-at-
tended condition attention was distributed across the
whole viewing area, whereas in the center-unattended
condition attention was only distributed to the periph-
eral areas around the center. Thus, attentional load
was higher in our center-attended condition than in the
center-unattended condition, which was supported also
by the analysis of the pupil size. The greater attentional
demand may have withdrawn attentional resources away
from the resources available for detecting the unexpectedstimulus. A similar explanation may be put forth to ac-
count for why in the experiments of Mack and Rock
(1998) inattentional blindness was greater when the
unexpected stimulus appeared at the ﬁxation and the ex-
pected stimulus at the periphery, as compared to the con-
dition in which the unexpected stimulus appeared at the
periphery and the expected stimulus at the ﬁxation. In
the former condition the observers did not know in ad-
vance where in the periphery the expected stimulus was
going to appear. Therefore, attention was more widely
distributed across the viewing area when the unexpected
stimulus appeared at ﬁxation than when it appeared at
periphery, which may have interfered with the detection
of the unexpected stimulus by withdrawing attentional
resources left for detection. Thus, variation in attentional
demands seems to explain the diﬀerent ﬁndings that at
ﬁrst glance may look contradictory between our study
and that of Mack and Rock.
The detection of the unexpected stimulus improved in
Experiment 2 when the unexpected stimulus belonged to
the semantic category of the expected stimuli. An unex-
pected stimulus from the expected category but with an
unexpected color (black digit) captured attention under
inattention condition and led to awareness of the stimu-
lus. This ﬁnding is in line with the results of Mack and
Rock (1998) who showed that there were some stimuli
that did capture attention and were detected under inat-
tention conditions. These were the observers name and
a happy face icon (see also Mack, Pappas, Silverman, &
Gay, 2002), but not for example stimulus onset, motion,
or color singleton which capture attention under divided
attention. Highly familiar words, someone elses name,
neutral face icon, or colored spot yielded strong inatten-
tional blindness. After ruling out that stimulus familiar-
ity was responsible for the capture of attention, Mack
and Rock (1998) concluded that the critical factor was
the signal value (meaningfulness) of the stimulus. Our
ﬁnding for the category condition extends this view by
suggesting that a neutral stimulus without any prior sig-
nal value will become a meaningful one for the observer
and capture attention if it is related to the task at hand.
The color of the unexpected stimulus had an eﬀect on
detection. When a red/blue or green circle was presented
instead of the black one, inattentional blindness was re-
duced, although not to the extent that occurred when
the circle was replaced with a black digit, which com-
pletely eliminated inattentional blindness. The ﬁnding
that the green circle was detected better than the black
circle suggest that stimulus salience has an eﬀect on
detection. Mack and Rock (1998) also manipulated the
color of the unexpected stimulus in several experiments.
In general, a colored stimulus (i.e., red or blue) did not
increase detection rates as compared to a black stimulus
in their experiments. Similarly, a selective-looking study
failed to show any enhanced detection for a colored, dis-
tinctive unexpected stimulus when the color of the
3220 M. Koivisto et al. / Vision Research 44 (2004) 3211–3221stimulus was diﬀerent from the colors used in the pri-
mary task (Most et al., 2001). However, in a subsequent
study (Most et al., in press) an unexpected stimulus with
salient color was detected with a higher probability than
a stimulus without salient color, suggesting together
with the current study that some of the bottom-up prop-
erties of the stimulus, such as color, contribute to the
likelihood of detecting an unexpected stimulus under
inattention. Mack and Rock (1998) may have failed to
demonstrate the eﬀect of color because they typically
used only black stimuli in the primary task and thus
the color was a completely irrelevant dimension.
In the present study, the primary task was to name the
ﬁrst digit (the red one) and then the second digit (the blue
one) in the order they appeared. In this task, the relation-
ship of the color of the unexpected stimulus to the color
of the attended digits did not have any eﬀects on the
probability of detection: a green stimulus was equally of-
ten detected as a red/blue stimulus. However, previous
studies under selective looking conditions have shown
that the degree of detection varies as a function of the vis-
ual similarity of the unexpected stimulus to the color of
the attended stimulus (Most et al., in press; Most et al.,
2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999). In these studies, the
observers discriminated the to-be-attended objects from
the to-be-ignored objects on the basis of the color, so that
the color was a highly relevant feature and was likely to
be included in the attentional set. In the present study,
there were no to-be-ignored stimuli and the two attended
objects occurred one at a time. Therefore, it was less
important to include the colors in the attentional set to
perform well in the primary task, whereas it was neces-
sary to do so in the selective looking experiments. Thus,
this crucial diﬀerence between the studies underlines the
point that the task demands determine the features which
are included in the attentional set and which will capture
attention. This point obtained further support from a
change blindness study of Wallis and Bu¨lthoﬀ (2000)
who directly manipulated the task demands and ob-
served that objects may not be aﬀorded detailed process-
ing if they are irrelevant to the task at hand. Moreover,
the ability to notice changes in objects may depend on
momentary task demands, so that the object feature
needs to be task relevant at exactly the right moment
(Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003).
In sum, the present study extends the previous work
on inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998) and
selective looking (Most et al., 2001; Simons & Chabris,
1999) by showing that looking at and monitoring the
relevant spatial location is not suﬃcient for awareness
under inattention and by underlining the critical role
of the relevance of the semantic features of the unex-
pected stimulus to the observers task under inattention.
Consistent with the late selection accounts of selective
attention (e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963), the ﬁnding
that meaningful stimuli are detected under inattentionimplies that attention is captured after the stimulus
has undergone semantic analysis, whereas stimuli that
are not meaningful to the task at hand are less likely
to capture attention and to lead to awareness. However,
the meaningfulness of the stimuli is not the only critical
factor. The degree of inattentional blindness also varies
as a function of the visual similarity of the unexpected
stimulus to the color of the attended stimulus, provided
that the task calls for color discrimination (Most et al.,
in press; Most et al., 2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999).
This eﬀect was not, however, replicated in the present
study probably because it was not necessary to discrim-
inate the attended stimuli on the basis of their color. In
addition, at least some bottom-up properties of the
unexpected stimulus, such as salience (e.g., color in
Experiment 2a and in Most et al., in press; stimulus size
in Mack & Rock, 1998), contribute to the probability of
explicit attentional capture.Acknowledgments
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